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Introduction
According to analysis from the McKinsey Global Institute, 
Africa has more than 400 companies with annual revenues 
exceeding US$1 billion. Many more are required to fuel the 
growth that will unlock the estimated US$5.6 trillion in Af-
rica’s business opportunities by 2025 (Bughin, Manyika, & 
Woetzel, 2016). Despite the success of these noted exemplars, 
MNEs operating across Africa often need to develop distinct 
capabilities that enable them to navigate and respond to weak 
or non-existent formal institutions – what Khanna and Palepu 
(2005) describe as “institutional voids.” This description ig-
nores the reality that institutions across Africa have evolved 
from a distinct history that accentuates the relevance of infor-
mal institutions in a manner that may be uniquely different 
from other regions, and worthy of closer examination, espe-
cially as most studies examine the institutional environment in 
Africa and its implications for firm performance and strategy 
from a predominantly Western perspective (Mair, Marti, & 
Ventresca, 2012; Khanna & Palepu, 2005).
We contribute to this debate by examining the institutional 
landscape in Africa from the perspective of MNEs operating 
across the continent. We draw on qualitative evidence from six 
advanced economy (AMNE) and emerging economy MNEs 
(EMNE) operating in Uganda and quantitative evidence from 
fifteen South African EMNEs operating across Africa to argue 
that the wide-scale reality of institutions that significantly differ 
from what some MNEs are familiar with should not necessarily 
imply institutional voids. This was a critical point of debate at 
the 2018 AIB Africa conference panel on “How MNEs nav-
igate different institutional environments across Africa.” We 
begin with a brief discussion on the relevance of institutions 
and the conceptual basis of our critique of the institutional 
void thesis. We then examine evidence from six in-depth case 
studies that outline how six MNEs developed strategies to par-
ticipate in the liberalisation of Uganda’s electricity sector. We 
build on these insights with further quantitative evidence from 
across the continent on the influence of transactional political 
strategies on the performance of fifteen South Africa MNEs 
operating across Africa.
Institutions Matter
Institutions matter and play a critical role in the function of 
markets and society as a whole, in developed economies, as well 
as in emerging and developing economies. There are, however, 
observed differences in the characteristics, operations, and ma-
turity of institutions across economy types. 
Institutions as distinct from the organizations that develop and 
enforce them, have been defined as “humanly devised con-
straints” or “rules of the game” (North, 1990) that shape the 
social and economic interactions between members of society. 
These so-called rule-based institutional environments have 
been shown to be conducive for firm performance, providing 
a predictable regulatory environment that reduces transaction 
16 AIB insights
costs and enables MNEs to plan ahead and focus on value-add-
ing activities. By contrast, in emerging economies, formal in-
stitutions are often weak or absent (Khanna & Palepu, 2005; 
Peng, Wang & Jiang, 2008; Meyer, Estrin, Bhaumik & Peng, 
2009). Where they exist, they are enforced poorly, or not at all. 
While the institutional voids thesis provides a useful frame-
work from which to explore and respond to the peculiarities of 
the institutional context firms operate in across emerging mar-
kets, some have questioned the accuracy of the term “voids” 
and what it implies. Olthaar, Dolfsma, Lutz, and Noseleit 
(2017), for instance, challenge the idea of an institutional “vac-
uum” implied by the term “voids,” and have suggested that 
even where formal institutions that regulate the proper func-
tioning of markets and economic activity are absent, or do not 
function as expected, institutions still affect firms; these can 
either be informal norms and practices or formal institutions 
from a different or adjacent practice or domain. Khanna and 
Palepu’s (2005) arguments on institutional voids in emerging 
economies leans heavily on the new institutional economics 
view, which pays little attention to the normative and cognitive 
expressions of institutions. They assert that emerging markets 
are different from Western markets and are characterized by 
increasing transaction costs and an absence of (Western-style 
formal) institutions. This position ignores the role of informal 
institutions, which provide the essential legitimacy for formal 
rules and assumes that institutions can be transferred across 
differing contexts. In African emerging economies, the in-
fluence of informal institutions cannot be ignored (Bagire & 
Namada, 2015; George, Corbishley, Khayesi, Haas & Tihanyi, 
2016, 2016; Zoogah, Peng, & Woldu, 2015). Though their 
enforcements are not regulated in the strict Western style, they 
form a significant part of the rules of the game that guide oper-
ations within these contexts. 
In reality, informal and formal institutions co-exist to estab-
lish the institutional mix of host countries, particularly in 
emerging markets. And depending on the context, can have a 
variety of configurations or interrelations, including, comple-
menting and increasing their joint effectiveness, substituting 
informal institutions for non-functioning formal institutions, 
or informal institutions competing against ineffective formal 
institutions (Helmke & Levitsky, 2004). This is particularly 
true across Africa where distinctive economic, institutional, 
and cultural systems and norms have emerged from a unique 
history and culture to evolve a business environment that is 
distinctively different from other regions in many ways – a 
phenomenon that is best examined with evidence from the ex-
perience of MNEs that operate across Africa, as detailed in the 
following sections.
Divergent MNE Experiences with  
Institutional Environments in Africa
In gathering evidence about heterogeneous responses to insti-
tutions in Africa, we draw on six MNEs that entered Ugan-
da’s electricity generation industry shortly before or after the 
implementation of pro-market reforms in the electricity sec-
tor in 2002. The qualitative, multi-case sample consists of 
three emerging economy MNEs and three advanced economy 
MNEs, thus offering insights into diverse MNE responses. The 
findings (established through exposing the qualitative data to 
a grounded analysis), suggest that some MNEs are most com-
petitive at the early stages of pro-market reforms, when formal 
institutions are least developed and effective and informal insti-
tutions are most prevalent. EMNEs generally adapt best at this 
stage, indicating an above-average possession of capabilities 
that are suitable for responding to informal institutions. Con-
versely, AMNEs adapt more effectively at later stages, reflecting 
capabilities to effectively respond to more formal institutions. 
When they enter strategic partnerships, however, EMNEs and 
AMNEs appear to create synergies and complementarity in the 
capabilities to respond to both informal and formal institu-
tions. They hence get positioned to adapt well at both early and 
late stages of reform, irrespective of the evolving institutional 
constellation. 
We conclude from these findings that the lack of effective for-
mal institutions, something that characterizes the early stag-
es of pro-market reforms in sub-Saharan African and other 
emerging and emerging markets, does not necessarily translate 
into a universal competitive disadvantage. Since the MNEs 
that derive advantage here do so using explicit institutional re-
sponses, we further infer that the response is not to “voids,” but 
to a set of institutions that are not formal. The EMNEs in our 
study demonstrate extensive capabilities in responding to these 
informal institutions and understanding their dynamics. The 
capabilities are gathered in the host market and in other Afri-
can markets that serve as incubators to nurture experience. In 
the end, some of the cases in the study acquired even more re-
In reality, informal and 
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fined capabilities that positioned them well for entry into more 
challenging markets in the wider region. One of the cases, for 
example, leveraged its experiences in Uganda to win a new li-
cence to develop a dam project at the border between Rwanda 
and the Democratic Republic of the Congo. 
EMNEs are often better able to understand the rules governing 
informal institutions, and therefore develop the corresponding 
capabilities to respond competitively. Consequently, 
AMNEs that enter strategic partnerships with expe-
rienced EMNEs position themselves to fill the gaps 
they have in responding to these institutions (Mbaly-
ohere, Lawton, Boojihawon, & Viney, 2017). In such 
partnerships, there is a complementarity between the 
two partners. One partner adapts to local informal 
institutions while the other partner adapts to global 
formal institutions. In our cases, the informal institu-
tions constituted the norms surrounding African tra-
ditional religious beliefs, expectations about gifts and 
favours, and relationships with diverse stakeholders 
at the grassroots of community. Global formal insti-
tutions, on the other hand, were typified by the reg-
ulatory demands of the World Bank, environmental 
protection agencies and similar bodies. The synergies that de-
velop from such strategic partnerships are ultimately import-
ant, not only at the early stages in helping AMNEs adapt to 
informal institutions, but also at later stages of reform in assist-
ing EMNEs in the partnership to respond better to emerging 
formal institutions. 
More broadly, we propose that what the MNEs in our study 
respond to are not institutional voids, but rather a constella-
tion of institutions with generally different rules than those 
AMNEs from highly formally institutionalized contexts are 
familiar with. In light of the growing attractiveness of new 
frontier markets, like those in sub-Saharan Africa, for foreign 
direct investment, we suggest that these markets are increasing-
ly emerging a more localized approach to institutions. Instead 
of seeking to further spend their meager resources to develop 
more sophisticated formal institutions after foreign templates, 
such countries have the strategic option to let institutions de-
velop more organically, with a higher appreciation of informal 
institutions. This will, in turn, strengthen the strategic comple-
mentarity between informal and formal institutions. More im-
portantly, it will provide a stronger context for the emergence 
and the nurturing of an African version of the free market 
economy. Since African economies are characterized by high 
rates of informality, informal institutions would be expected to 
have a significant influence under such circumstances. 
Making the strategic institutional re-orientation in Africa even 
more intense is the growing entry of EMNEs from Asia, espe-
cially from China and India. Since these markets also have a 
strong history of informal institutions, experiences with these 
institutions in Africa are getting more complicated. We expect 
that hybrid experiences will emerge and influence what ulti-
mately works or does not work in Africa. We also envisage that 
African countries will increasingly become more assertive in 
creating conditions in which local informal institutions get pri-
oritized and are enabled to develop further. 
The informal institutions at the bottom of the pyramid are par-
ticularly important, given that this accounts for the majority of 
Africa’s population, and it is here that efforts to help people es-
cape poverty have most impact. Consequently, MNEs involved 
in major projects located in the communities at bottom of the 
pyramid can respond to informal institutions in ways that ei-
ther strategically support or undermine anti-poverty programs.
Employing Non-Market Strategies in 
Sub-Saharan Africa
The reality of weak or different institutional environments re-
quires that MNEs operating in Africa critically consider what 
strategies are being transferred from institutionally different 
contexts. In this section, we discuss the contradicting influence 
of transactional political strategies on subsidiary performance 
to what is obtainable in developed economies as indicated in 
previous research (Hadani & Schuler, 2013: Hillman, 2003).
Drawing on evidence from quantitative research surveys of se-
nior executives of South African MNE operations across sub-Sa-
haran Africa, we find that unlike in developed economies such 
as the United States, where transactional political strategies like 
lobbying and political action committee contributions are ef-
fectively part of the formally institutionalized system that re-
quires that all firms declare their political expenditure policies, 
Africa has a different institutional environment. Our evidence 
suggests that transactional political strategies, employed as and 
when needed in Africa, do not necessarily provide competitive 
advantages for the firms (Hillman, Keim, & Schuler, 2004) in 
the long run. While they provide an entry point for the firm, 
to sustain performance, MNE subsidiaries need to develop re-
We expect that hybrid 
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influence what ultimately works 
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lationships through constituency building, with stakeholders 
in the host environment. This may signal to MNEs to move 
away from such transactional political strategies to other re-
lational-based ways of gaining influence, especially given the 
collectivist nature of sub-Sahara African societies, and the need 
to employ non-engaged approaches, like low visibility and rap-
id compliance to informal institutions in these environments. 
Even though the use of transactional political strategies signi-
fies a firm’s buffering mechanism to proactively influence their 
environment, the evidence suggests that this does not apply 
in all contexts. Hillman and Hitt (1999) argue that within 
weak institutional environments, such transactional political 
strategies are more effective, the evidence suggests differently. 
Premised on our findings and corroborated by the positions 
of a number of scholars (Rajwani and Liedong, 2015; Mbaly-
ohere, 2015; White, Hemphill, Joplin & Marsh, 2014), it can 
be argued that a transactional approach to political strategies is 
not a precursor to increased subsidiary performance, but rath-
er MNEs need to exploit other political strategies (De Villa, 
Rajwani, Lawton, & Mellahi, 2018). For example, a relational 
strategy that thrives on a continuous maintenance of relation-
ships, and constituency building may yield more positive re-
sults for MNEs. In Africa, where communal informal institu-
tions abound, this remains important.
Though similar to the relational motive of engaging in corpo-
rate social responsibility (CSR), relational political strategies 
are different, in the sense that unlike firms’ use of CSR which 
seeks to influence the social environment and improve their tri-
ple bottom line, the application of relational political strategies 
seeks to, in a myriad of ways, influence the political environ-
ment by building its legitimacy within that environment. Such 
socio-political legitimacy is necessary to be able to adequately 
harness the MNEs political strategy as it relates to embedded-
ness in the environment.
Conclusions
This article re-examines the institutional voids perspective from 
the lens of MNEs operating across Africa. Drawing on quali-
tative evidence from the experience of six AMNE and EMNEs 
operating in Uganda and quantitative evidence from fifteen 
South African EMNEs operating across Africa, we propose 
that the use of the term to describe the institutional configu-
ration of emerging markets proposes a judgement on contexts 
that are institutionally different from Western developed econ-
omies, which may limit our inclinations to actively interrogate 
these contexts to understand and co-evolve with them. 
In reality, MNEs operating in Africa respond to a mix of infor-
mal and formal institutions that have evolved from a distinct 
history that accentuates the relevance of informal institutions 
in a manner that is distinctively different from other regions. 
Given this difference, MNEs need to critically consider what 
strategies can be transferred from institutionally different con-
texts; and what new capabilities are required to successfully op-
erate across Africa.
The institutional environment in many African countries is 
still evolving, and informal institutions will continue to play a 
significant part in the rules of the game. We propose that stra-
tegic partnerships that incorporate non-market relational strat-
egies that thrive on a continuous maintenance of relationships, 
and constituency building may yield more positive results for 
MNEs operating in Africa.
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